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ABSTRACT
The Truman Administration and Zionist Legitimation Strategies to Achieve Statehood
by
Gianna Meier

Advisor: Professor Simon Davis

Following World War II, with the strength of Britain shattered by economic exhaustion
and the rising influence of the United States in post-war international policies, the Zionist
commitment to Jewish statehood intensified, driven even more urgently by the specter of the
Holocaust atrocities. Meanwhile, warfare in Palestine both between the Jews and the Palestinian
Arabs and between the Jews and Britain increased tension in the region to such a point that Britain
decided in February 1947 to withdraw from its obligations under the Mandate for Palestine. 1 It left
to the United Nations (UN) the challenge of finding a workable resolution to the Jewish-Arab
conflict.
President Harry Truman, successor to the presidency upon the death of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in 1945, mistrusted the British bureaucracy and had no intention of striking up a close
political partnership with British politicians. Between 1945 and the establishment of the State of
Israel in 1948, America and Britain, each in their own way and driven by their own regional
interests, worked hard to find a satisfactory solution for Palestine. Influenced by his White House
advisors and World Zionist leaders, Truman supported the Zionist cause. It is not unlikely that the

1

Council of the League of Nations to Britain, April 25, 1920. British Mandate for Palestine. Memorandum. UNOG
Library; ref.: C. 529. M.314. 1922.VI. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_for_Palestine (accessed November
16, 2919).
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presidential election looming in 1948 kept him focused on it despite the opposition of the U.S.
State Department. That part of the administration, opposed such policy based on its concerns over
the strategic significance of oil and the political cross-currents in the Middle East.
Conversely, Britain, far more anti-Zionist in its proclivities and less inclined to resolve the
matter, was determined to maintain its imperial ties and relationships with the Arab world. This
desire was made even more strategic in light of Britain’s diminishment during the preceding World
Wars. Essentially, both the American State Department and the British Foreign Office
underestimated the resourcefulness of the Zionists. This miscalculation redounded to the favor of
the Zionists, who emerged victorious from the vote on the 1947 UN Partition Plan, 2 with its
recognition of the validity of a Jewish state. This success owed much to the White House staff and
the President and, thus, to the U.S. election of 1948.

2

United Nations to United Kingdom, November 29, 1947. United Nations Plan for Palestine, adopted as Resolution
181 (II) by the UNGA. Plan. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Partition_Plan_for_Palestine (accessed
November 20, 2019).
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INTRODUCTION
Although this thesis considers America’s cooperation with Britain and its participation in
both the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry (AAC) 3 and the Morrison-Grady Report,4
leading to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, it also underscores the crucial role that American politics
played in the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It is very possible that consideration of
the 1948 United States election and the potential role of the Jewish vote in it tipped the balance
and kept President Harry Truman focused on partition and led to his ultimate quick recognition of
the newly founded state. This thesis will demonstrate how Truman’s belief in a particular Palestine
policy was swayed by psychological means and by the influence of both the White House advisors
and the Zionist leaders throughout his presidency. I will also focus on the counter-balance of the
State Department’s key leaders and their opposition to that Palestine policy based on their fear of
the loss of U.S. prestige and economic compacts in the Middle East. Likewise, I will analyze
Britain’s opposition to U.S. Palestine policy in view of its own oil and strategic interests in the
region, and demonstrate how Britain’s deferral of the Mandate to the UN and its effects ultimately
blazed the way to the creation of Israel.
Even before the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the British were suggesting
plans for the ultimate disposition of Palestine which was eventually assigned by the League of
Nations to Britain and incorporated into the British Mandate. In 1917, the British government
announced its support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine through the

3

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, April 20, 1946.
Report. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-American_Committee_of_Inquiry (accessed November 15, 2019).
4
Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison to the British Parliament, July 31, 1946. Morrison-Grady Plan. Provincial
Autonomy Plan. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morrison–Grady_Plan (accessed November 20, 2019).
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Balfour Declaration.5 The document read: “His Majesty's government view with favor the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” 6
One part of the responsibilities in the Declaration read: “Recognition has been given to the
historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their
national home in that country…”7 Hence, the Balfour Declaration was based on an implicit
acceptance of world Jewry’s long standing belief in the Holy Land since it was not Jews who
needed to accept such a connection. They already held it for millennia, but the larger world needed
to acknowledge it or at least be involved in making it a reality. In essence, the Declaration
supported the goal of reconstituting the Jewish People in that territory and recognized a preexisting indigenous connection validated by history.
Policymakers in the United States in the early twentieth century completely overlooked the
Palestine situation, considering it purely as a biblical land destined for reclamation by Christians
and Jews and in which the native Arab people were insignificant. Notably, Woodrow Wilson
(1913-1921) was the first U.S. president to take a policy stance on the Palestine issue, confirming
the biblical history of Christians and Jews in the Holy Land and endorsing the Balfour Declaration
as a solemn U.S. commitment. With his supportive gesture for the establishment of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine, he backed Britain’s aim in World War I and showed susceptibility to his

5

Arthur J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild, November 2, 1917. Balfour Declaration 1917. Letter. British Library.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration (accessed December 8, 2019).
6
Balfour Declaration 1917.
7
Eli E. Hertz, Mandate for Palestine, Myths and Facts, Inc. (2007), 5.
http://www.mythsandfacts.org/conflict/mandate_for_palestine/Mandate_for_Palestine.pdf.
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American Zionist friends’ opinions. What influenced Wilson’s support for Zionism the most
strongly was probably his friendship with Louis Brandeis, the leading American Zionist activist in
that time.8 It is important to note that there was no disagreement at the State Department of that
era over Wilson’s inclination toward Zionism. Albeit U.S. Jews were still few in number; they
were adept and well organized. Not only were they the prime movers in influencing official U.S.
policy on Palestine, but they also famously molded public opinion. 9 Thus, Zionist activists worked
with the U.S. Congress from a very early stage on.
Soon after the Declaration’s proclamation, with its stated dual obligations to both the
Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists, the promulgation opened the prospect of far-reaching changes
in Palestine’s future, including its most positive – and most tragic – consequences. The changes in
British policies vis-à-vis the Zionist pledge ultimately enabled the emergence of a Jewish state and
a relentless conflict between two peoples. The period between 1920 and 1930 witnessed a cluster
of dramatic events and political repercussions in Palestine and London, among the most critical in
Jewish-Arab relations from the announcement of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 until the end of
the British Mandate in 1948. The ongoing strains of aggression and antagonism between the
Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs forced unavoidable confrontations for and persistent challenges
to Britain, resulting in accusations of double-dealing and disloyal conduct from both parties. 10
The Declaration’s ambiguous recognition of obligation to both the Jews and the Palestinian
Arabs meant that the British government could not establish a stable state in Palestine, and thus

8

Kathleen Christison, “U.S. Policy and the Palestinians: Bound by a Frame of Reference,” Journal of Palestine
Studies 26, no. 4 (1997), 49.
9
Ibid., 50.
10
Martin Bunton, “Mandate Daze: Stories of British Rule in Palestine, 1917-48,” International Journal of Middle East
Studies 35, no. 3 (2003), 486.
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the territory came to be seen in Britain as a liability.11 As part of its colonial outlook, Britain’s
objectives in the region included key economic interests in the territory such as the protection of
the Suez Canal and the sea route to India, which was so often labeled “the jewel in the British
crown.” Nevertheless, Zionist aspirations played into British hands, paving the way for the
preservation of its strategic interests in the Middle East, while Zionist investment in Palestine
offset the costs of Britain’s imperial endeavors in exchange for a pledge of Jewish selfdetermination there. The Declaration had been the bargaining chip and the basis upon which
Zionist collaboration had been accepted in Palestine.12 For the Zionist leaders, the Declaration was
both a political victory of the movement’s diplomacy and a major step toward the establishment
of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. What mattered to the Zionists most was the backing of a
world power for their cause – the establishment of their homeland in Palestine.
On another note, the mass murder of European Jewry during World War II did not shift
Britain’s policy of limiting Jewish immigration or its refusal to admit Jews from Nazi-controlled
Europe in numbers beyond the quota imposed by the 1939 White Paper.13 Prior to that, Britain had
issued two more statements of policy for Palestine – the Churchill White Paper of 1922 14 and the
Passfield White Paper of 1930.15 The Churchill White Paper reconfirmed Britain’s commitment to
the Balfour Declaration and its promise of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, emphasizing that
the creation of a national home would not impose a Jewish nationality on the Arab inhabitants of

11

Michael J. Cohen, “Was the Balfour Declaration at Risk in 1923? Zionism and British Imperialism,” The Journal
of Israeli History 29, no. 1 (2010), 80.
12
Cohen, “Was the Balfour Declaration at Risk,” 90.
13
British government and Neville Chamberlain to Parliament, May 23, 1939. White Paper of 1939. Policy Document.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Paper_of_1939 (accessed November 16, 2019).
14
Command of His Majesty to Parliament, June 3, 1922. Churchill White Paper. Policy Document.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Churchill_White_Paper (accessed January 16, 2020).
15
Passfield, Lord Sidney Webb to Parliament, October 1, 1930. Passfield White Paper. Policy Document.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passfield_white_paper (accessed January 16, 2020).
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Palestine. It also stated that the Jews were in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance, and it
limited Jewish immigration to the territory’s “economic absorptive capacity” as a factor for
determining the Jewish immigration quota for Palestine.16 The Passfield White Paper, on the other
hand, still committed the British to continuing their support for a Jewish National Home in
Palestine, but it also dealt with security, constitutional development, and economic and social
development. It proposed the establishment of a legislative council with a composition similar to
that proposed in the Churchill White Paper. It further criticized the substantial employment of Jews
in the territory which, it implied, displaced Arab workers and made it difficult to reconcile with
Zionist declarations of a desire to live in friendship with the Arab people. In order to determine
the economic capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants, both Jewish and Arab
unemployment had to be taken into account as Jewish immigration would be suspended if it were
held to prevent Arabs from obtaining employment. 17
The Passfield White Paper was per se anti-Jewish and very favorable to the Palestinian
Arabs. It also revealed a critical attitude and political change in British policy towards the Zionist
aspirations for the continuing development of the Jewish National Home while it further
represented a new direction for its overall commitment to the Balfour Declaration, imposing
restrictions that reached full maturation and practical political expression a few years later with
the 1939 White Paper. This third paper served as a statement of Britain’s overriding policy for
Mandatory Palestine from 1939 until its withdrawal in 1948 and called for the establishment of an
independent Palestine state within 10 years. The independent state projected by this final White
Paper would be one in which Arabs and Jews shared government in such a way as to safeguard the

16
17

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Churchill_White_Paper.
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essential interests of each community. It also limited Jewish immigration and land purchases and
stipulated that further immigration would be determined by the Arab majority. 18
Tom Segev maintains that people were indeed wondering how the mistreatment of the Jews
in Germany would touch upon Palestinian life, hoping that the suffering and anxiety might open
unique opportunities and increase immigration to the Holy Land. Ben-Gurion “hoped that a Nazi
victory would become ‘a fertile force’ for Zionism.” 19 Regarded retrospectively, the Holocaust
tragedy may have been the defining factor in the Zionists’ successful efforts to achieve statehood.
During the Holocaust period, Zionist ranks in America grew exceptionally quickly, influencing
not only the White House and the U.S. Congress but also the media and the American public at
large. In contrast to the heavy Zionist lobbying unspooling swiftly, the Palestinian Arabs did little
to contribute to American awareness of their position at that time. Neither news articles nor books
projected advantageous images of the Palestinians, though positive images of Zionist pioneers
prospering in Palestine became many. 20
Britain, however, in need of stability and in order to safeguard its position in the Middle
East, chose to support the Palestinian Arabs as a show of good faith toward the neighboring Arab
States, and convened a roundtable conference in London to discuss the future of Palestine. This
event clearly underscored the scope of Britain’s concessions towards the Arab world, the
importance it gave to being on the side of the Palestinians in this conflict with the Jews, and the
expectations it envisaged for its own further advancement in the region. 21

18

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Paper_of_1939.
Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 18-19.
20
Christison, “U.S. Policy and the Palestinians,” 50-51.
21
Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921-1951 (Oxford: Columbia
University Press, 1990), 61.
19

6

From the Zionist point of view, however, despite this favorable press, Britain’s overall
position had shifted in an undesirable direction, nourished by negative stereotyped attitudes
towards the Jews as being of no political use in contrast to the Arabs’ considerable value to British
imperial interests in the region. The general balance of attitudes weighed undoubtedly against
Zionist aspirations in Palestine and made it abundantly clear how much and how far the British
had chosen sides between Jews and Arabs in the Palestinian situation. Regardless of the difficult
conditions, the Zionists were nonetheless fortunate that Britain’s withdrawal of support of the
Balfour Declaration was gradual. This, gave them enough of a chance to build up their homeland
to the point where it was capable of taking its destiny in its own hands at the appropriate time.
In the wake of World War II, Britain still maintained control over Palestine, but its prestige
and influence had been badly damaged during that period. Financial insolvency and reduced
economic independence not only undercut Britain’s imperial base in the Middle East, but it also forced
Britain to give up its standing as a global power.22 It was of utmost importance for Britain’s longterm economic recovery to maintain friendly relations with the Arabs as well as its historic role in
the Middle East,23 albeit this was essentially superseded by the rising strength of the United States.
Thus, when Truman took on the presidency in 1945, he inherited more than the consequences of
the atrocities of the Holocaust. He inherited the jumbled legacy of Jewish aspirations and
Roosevelt’s contradictory promises to Jewish and Arab leaders regarding Palestine. In addition,

22

John B. Judis, Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict (New York: Farrar
Straus and Giroux, 2014), 188.
23
Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry, “Jewish Persecution and Zionism,” In The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic
Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 88.
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he embraced a “public political posture embodied in the 1944 plank of the Democratic Party
platform, giving solid backing to the Zionist aims in Palestine.” 24
Based on the conclusion of the Harrison Report25, Truman sent a request to the British
asking that a large number of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) from the occupied zones be admitted
to Palestine. The Report was the result of an investigation into the plight of those DPs by Earl G.
Harrison. The President’s request further asked the British to find a solution to the struggle between
the Arab and Jewish communities there. In response, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister,
proposed various plans to solve the political, economic, and social dilemmas in Palestine. 26 Upon
the failure of two attempts to resolve the situation as presented by the Anglo-American Committee
of Inquiry and the Morrison-Grady Plan, Britain consigned the Mandate to the UN to find a
workable solution to the problem.
In November 1947 the UN General Assembly (GA) called for a partition of Palestine into
two political entities: an Arab state and a Jewish state with an international trusteeship for
Jerusalem and the surrounding areas. These were to be joined in an economic union to ensure the
economic viability of partitioned Palestine.27 When on November 29, 1947, the Partition Plan was
adopted as Resolution 181, the Zionist leaders attained international legitimacy for their efforts to
establish a Jewish state, which paved the way for a now more aggressive strategy concluding
ultimately in the creation of a Jewish state in part of Palestine.

24

Dennis Ross, The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama: Doomed to Succeed (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2016), 6-8.
25
Harrison Earl G. to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, July 1945. Harrison Report. Report.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrison_Report (accessed November 15, 2019).
26
Itzhak Galnoor, “The Zionist Debates on Partition (1919-1947),” Israel Studies 14, no. 2 (2009), 83-84.
27
Harms and Ferry, “Jewish Persecution and Zionism,” In The Palestine Israel Conflict, 89-90.
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CHAPTER I: U.S. Strategic Interest in the Middle East: Oil
In contrast to Britain after World War II, America was in a much stronger position. Its
economy produced over half of the world’s goods and services, and the pound sterling, previously
the world’s central currency, was displaced by the dollar. The U.S. forces, which had defeated
Germany along with the Soviet Union and Britain and had vanquished Japan, were left with only
one rival – the Soviet Union. Although the United States took over Britain’s post atop global
capitalism, it did not want to supersede Britain everywhere in the world arena. 28 Truman preferred
not to strike up a close political partnership with British politicians or to trust in the British
bureaucracy. He dismissed colonialism outright “as an underlying cause of war and oppression,”
while his career State Department officers worked hard to foster a successful wind-up of Britain’s
presence in Palestine and elsewhere.29 Finally, yet importantly, America was also preparing to
assume the hegemonial role of Britain in the region by the evolution of a policy concept regarding
Palestine, except that it would follow a non-imperial leadership approach. American regional
planners saw the nascent Jewish state clearly as critical to weakening the substantial influence of
Britain in the Middle East.30
As Palestine’s strategic position provided a base of operations at the center of three
continents, it became a very important area, particularly after the war. The most important factors
were oil access, the rising value of U.S. oil investments in the region, and the safeguarding of
American citizens. Nevertheless, the State Department feared that supporting a Jewish National
Home in Palestine would strain U.S. relations with the Arab world, jeopardize oil access, and

28
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provide an opening wedge for Soviet influence in the region. 31. Thus, U.S. policy was guided by
broad but clear objectives – the attainment of a peaceful solution in Palestine, a desire not to
involve U.S. troops, and the preservation of the region from Soviet power. Eventually, America
would rise to become the leading power of the postwar world which economy would develop into
three times the size of the U.S.S.R.’s and five times the size of Britain’s, controlling half of the
world’s industrial output and three-quarters of its gold assets. 32
The most significant oil interests dealing with U.S. companies was the Arabian American
Oil Company (ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia. It “constituted the center of an archipelago of
petroleum wealth, and it was run as a replica of the State Department.” 33 The Pentagon and the
State Department had envisioned building a base there even before the end of the war. The foreign
petroleum policy of the United States recognized the regions of Russia, Romania, Iraq, Iran, and
the Arabian Peninsula as well as those of Turkey, the Levantine coastal areas, Afghanistan, and
Baluchistan as essential oilfields. However, U.S. Middle East policy centered on Iran, Iraq, and
the Arabian peninsula states including Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, and Trucial Oman.34 As a matter of fact, American stockholders held under concession a
quarter of Iraq’s oil grounds.35 The U.S. War Department also expressed its desire to sustain Saudi
Arabian interests for both the state’s geographical location and its oil reserves, highlighting the
oilfields in the “Mesopotamian Basin area of the Persian Gulf, constituting a source of
incomparable wealth whose possession would allow Washington to exercise global influence.” 36

31

Judis, Genesis,199.
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33
Irene L. Gendzier, Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine & the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 13.
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Ibid., 8.
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Louis maintains that Britain should have furthered the economic exploitation of Saudi
Arabia by U.S. oil companies as a way to anchor U.S. collaboration in the Middle East rather than
oppose it.37 Conversely, Saudi Arabia considered the United States useful as a replacement for
Britain, now in a weakened economic position after the war, and a help in increasing the finances
of King ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Saud. Nevertheless, the growing oil revenues would increasingly bind
Saudi Arabia to the United States, becoming an unavoidable fact. 38 The British, however, viewed
U.S. influence as a threat to their own existence. Laurence Grafftey-Smith, British Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia from 1945 to 1947, expressed great concern about the inflow of U.S. money to the
region.39
The U.S. office involved in matters related to Palestine was the Near East and African
Affairs (NEA) division under Loy Henderson; Secretary of State George C. Marshall; and his
assistant, Robert Lovett. The department’s advisors ardently asserted that the interest of the United
States lay with the Arabs because of oil. The person in charge of representing the department’s
position was Henderson.40 He, like many other State Department officials, viewed American
backing for a Jewish National Home as a potential risk, endangering Arab relations and posing a
possible challenge to the Soviets.41 Both the White House and the U.S. Congress viewed
Henderson as an anti-Semite,42 whose ultimate goal was to put Palestine under British trusteeship

37

Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 173.
Ibid., 193.
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Ibid., 191.
40
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again with world-power aid.43 Henderson’s attitude was “a cold-blooded realism about American
interests that State Department officials of his generation cultivated.” 44
Through the lens of the Zionist leaders, the State Department’s opposition was labeled as
“Arabist.” In a show of resistance, the Zionist activists made sure that the department received
thousands of letters denouncing its pro-Arab stance. 45 The State Department’s failure to win
support for its position derived perhaps in part from two reasons. First, it seemed to oppose both
the perceived humanitarian needs of the Jewish DPs, as presented by the Zionists and their
successful public relations efforts, and those DPs’ need for a safe haven from further oppression.
Second, it failed to have a solid grounding from which to oppose pro-Israeli images.

43

Arnold A. Offner, Another such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War 1945-1953 (Stanford CA: Stanford
University Press, 2002), 279.
44
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Chapter II: The Truman Administration and the Partisan State Department Officials:
Competing Objectives
When Truman was sworn in as President in April 1945, he embraced all of Roosevelt’s
equivocal policies on the contending Arab and Jewish claims, Britain’s conflicting promises, and
the great-power enmities in the Middle East. He faced new policy decisions on humanitarian,
diplomatic, and strategic levels, but he was also challenged by domestic politics and personal
pressure and the need to maintain good relations with the Arabs in order to expand access to oil.
Although Truman’s perspective on Zionism and Palestine was rather parochial and not as fixed as
Balfour’s, Lloyd George’s, or Wilson’s,46 he was forced to make a decision his predecessors had
sidestepped.47 He was obliged to maneuver between a growing, aggressive Zionist lobby allied
with his own White House advisors and a State Department which was unequivocally opposed to
Zionism. These contrary positions within his administration caused him great concern and
hindered his decision-making.48
From the moment the Zionist leaders approached Truman, the pressure on him to back the
Zionist cause intensified. The influence of Zionist organizations in the U.S. grew significantly,
reaching from the White House and U.S. Congress to the media and progressively to the public at
large as the Holocaust atrocities became known. American Zionist organizations such as the
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and Hadassah played a decisive part in creating a body of
opinion favoring the Zionist program in Palestine and ignoring the reasons for Arab opposition. 49
The most influential leaders were Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, head of the American Zionist

46
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Emergency Council (AZEC) and Rabbi Stephen Wise of New York, co-chairman of the AZEC.
The committee’s main function was to exercise political pressure and to influence the American
government to support Zionist aims. Silver’s objective was to create a Jewish state in the whole of
Palestine as opposed to Wise who envisaged a Jewish state within it. 50 He also had tried to
influence American administrations from Wilson’s on after realizing, along with other Zionist
leaders, that the center of foreign backing had shifted from a besieged Britain to America. 51 Under
Silver’s guidance, the AZEC turned into a militant lobbying group, threatening to withdraw Jewish
political backing from the Democrats and Truman if they did not respect the committee’s demand
for a Jewish state.52
In fact, it was only few days after Truman took office that Wise visited the White House
to remind him about the DP Jews in Europe and the urgency of establishing a Jewish National
Home in Palestine.53 Similarly, Truman was also reminded by Secretary of State Edward
Stettinius, followed by James Byrnes from 1945 to 1947 and then by George Marshall until 1949,
that Zionist leaders would reach out to extract an early commitment from him, 54 emphasizing that,
since America’s influence was growing in the region, the wrong decision could endanger Arab
relations.55 In fact, over 80 percent of American citizenry were well-versed in the ongoing situation
in Palestine and Europe.56
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The realities of the Holocaust stirred American Jewry and their Zionist leaders to exercise
all their strength to push for the establishment of a Jewish state, while their votes formed a central
element in their ability to influence government activities regarding Palestine and the upcoming
U.S. election.57 Thus, Truman had a strong interest in mastering the Palestine issue, since his
domestic political advisors and the strength of Zionist-influenced factors mattered significantly to
his chance of winning the upcoming election. Many among Truman’s advisors were affiliated with
one or the other existing Zionist organization, convincing him that all Jews favored a Jewish state
in Palestine and that their votes would ultimately affect the outcome of the electoral vote. 58
Notably, the American Zionist leadership did not hesitate to use the promise of the Jewish vote’s
potential to influence the outcome of the presidential and congressional elections as a cudgel to
advance Zionist aims in Palestine.59 Both Wise and Silver viewed the Jewish vote as a powerful
instrument beneficial to the Zionist movement in its potential to influence the American political
system at large. In fact, Silver exploited the Jewish vote as a central factor and sought to mold an
ethnically based Jewish voting coalition into a political force that favored a Jewish state in
Palestine.60 However, many Jewish voters were afraid of being regarded as an ethnic group of
doubtful loyalty as opposed to citizens with equal rights. 61
Nevertheless, Truman’s decision-making was ultimately influenced directly by the proZionists in his immediate entourage. One of the principal White House advisors in terms of overall
influence on the President’s thinking was Clark M. Clifford, whose advice was based on
humanitarian as well as domestic policies. Clifford was most instrumental in the short-term
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logistics of endorsing partition in the UN and an important influence on Truman’s decision to
recognize Israel.62 Moreover, Max Lowenthal acted as Clifford’s unofficial legal adviser on
Palestine and was a political crony of Truman’s. He strongly supported the Zionist cause and was
considered to be the expert on Palestine in the White House. 63 Likewise, David Niles was an
influential person in the White House inner circle who served as Truman’s special assistant for
minority affairs of which Jewish affairs were one. Both Niles and Lowenthal had extensive
contacts among Zionist organizations and served as conduits for information going into and out of
the White House. Henderson was positive that “every memorandum Niles sent to the White House
would find its way immediately to the Zionist leaders.” 64 The Jewish Agency (JA) considered him
“one of the trump cards held by Zionists.”65
Last but not least was Eddie Jacobson, a Jewish immigrant from Lithuania, and a long-time
friend of Truman’s, who played a substantial role for the President on a personal level. Although
he did not belong to any Zionist organization, Jacobson still envisioned a national homeland in
Palestine for the diaspora Jews. He was to return to the scene many times as the “quasi ambassador
of the new state of Israel.”66 All three of these men had easy access to the President, exchanging
regularly written memoranda and meeting up for informal briefings. 67 They helped to influence
and shape Truman’s perspective on the Palestine issue as well as manage to persuade him that in
making political choices based on his Palestine polices, he was not capitulating to electoral
pressure but was doing some humanitarian good deeds. 68
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In the aftermath of the Holocaust atrocities, “the fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism
was a matter of deep personal concern” to Truman, as Dean Acheson, undersecretary of state,
proclaimed.69 The President’s perspective emerged clearly when he signed a commemoration of
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Furthermore, he proposed creating a haven
for Jews at a Holocaust rescue rally in Chicago saying, “this is not a Jewish problem. It is an
American problem – and we must and will face it squarely and honorably.”70 He also fervently
believed that Britain had an obligation to respect the Balfour Declaration of 1917, supporting the
creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.71 Christison claims that each subsequent
administration took Woodrow Wilson’s endorsement of the Balfour Declaration as a solemn and
unalterable pledge, serving to defend the Jews and undervalue Arab interests. 72 Truman seems to
have been no exception.
According to Truman’s memoirs, “The Balfour Declaration, promising the Jews the
opportunity to re-establish a homeland in Palestine, had always seemed to me to go hand in hand
with the noble policies of Woodrow Wilson, especially the principle of self-determination.” 73
Whenever Truman alluded to the Arab majority’s own right to self-determination, he simply
denied it and put the reference in quotation marks.74 In essence, Truman was neither concerned
about the Arabs nor the potential loss of Arab oil, differing in this from Henderson, who greatly
cared about the U.S. standing and a friendly relationship with King ‘Abd al-Aziz and the
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surrounding Arab nations. As a matter of fact, Truman’s presidency had “completed the
domestication of the Palestine issue.”75
Notably, Truman’s political tendency to take a Zionist stand went back to his Christian
belief in the Bible. Not only were his speeches full of Bible references, but his knowledge of
scripture also underlay his notions of Palestine’s history. 76 Essentially, he recognized Palestine as
the land promised by God to the Jews, and he was not further inclined to educate himself about
the realities on the ground related to Arab concerns in Palestine. His understanding and perception
of Palestine was entirely founded upon biblical concepts in concert with his assumed political
needs.77 When Stettinius’s State Department proposed a different view of Palestine, Truman
accused them of being biased and labeled them “an anti-Semitic bunch,” saying “they put the Jews
in the same category as Chinamen and Negroes.” 78
Truman’s advisors clearly created a steady pro-Zionist attitude in the White House as
opposed to the State Department, the primary objective of which was to safeguard U.S. economic
ties and its strategic bases in the Middle East. Cohen claims that the department accused Truman
of opposing the national interest not just because of his concerns for the Jewish DPs but because
of his “narrow political interest in the strategically-placed Jewish vote.” 79 Truman, however, made
it clear in a statement that his support for the DP Jews was not directly linked to the creation of a
Jewish State. “It was my attitude that America could not stand by while the victims of Hitler’s
racial madness were denied opportunities to build new lives. Neither, however, did I want to see a
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political structure imposed on the Near East that would result in conflict; my basic approach was
that the log-range fate of Palestine was the kind of problem we had the UN for. For the immediate
future, however, some aid was needed for the Jews in Europe to find a place to live in decency.” 80
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Chapter III: Anglo-American Collaboration: Failed Attempts
Prior to the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Truman received numerous letters from
individual members of Congress and Jewish spokesmen begging him for support of the Jewish
cause. The Zionist leaders urged Truman to request that the British revoke the 1939 White Paper
and “open Palestine to mass immigration” and “reconstitute” Palestine as a “Jewish
commonwealth.”81
After years of unsympathetic British policy and not expecting any moderation from the
British on the future of Palestine along Zionist lines before the end of the war, the Zionist leaders
managed “to persuade their people to accept in a disciplined manner the terrible misfortunes which
had been visited upon world Jewry in the last few years.” 82 In Palestine, as elsewhere, “the Zionist
leadership had been strongly criticized for following a policy of ‘appeasement’ instead of insisting
on the literal fulfillment of Jewish demands.”83 This posture caused a “mood of impatience and
desperation” among Jews in view of the policies of both the United States and Britain. That
disposition seemed unlikely to lift unless some concessions were made to the Jews. 84 Thus, the
Zionists’ demands were put forth again to make sure that Truman understood completely the
meaning of the Zionist pledge in all of its aspects once America’s involvement picked up
momentum in the Middle East.
Prior to the Conference, in a meeting between Henderson and Ben-Gurion in June 1945,
Ben-Gurion restated the Zionist position regarding the Balfour Declaration and the 1939 White
Paper. He stressed the opposition of the Jews of Palestine to Britain’s present policy by declaring
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that “unless this intolerable regime were modified, there was bound to be trouble, since the Jews
could not continue indefinitely to put up with the breach by the administration of its obligations to
the Jewish people.”85 Moreover, Ben-Gurion stressed that “what the Jews desire[d] was to be
allowed to set their own house in order without interference from outside elements.” 86 He
continued, pointing out that “the Jews for the past few years had received promises from Allied
leaders which had caused them to believe that they would eventually see the fruition of their aims
in Palestine, if only they kept quiet during the European war. Now that the war was over the Jews
were beginning to ask what was holding up the implementation of these pledges.” 87 The Zionist
leaders had now come “to the point where they could no longer accept anything less than the
granting of all their demands, including the immediate establishment of a Jewish State.” 88 It was
of critical importance to the Zionist leaders that they could finally bring about a safe haven for the
Jewish DPs as well as a barrier to future anti-Semitism in Palestine.
King ‘Abd al-Aziz, on the other hand, characterized this sensitive matter differently. He
declared that “the Zionist Jews have used this humanitarian appeal as an excuse for attaining their
own ends of aggression against Palestine: – these aims being to conquer Palestine and by achieving
a majority to make it Jewish, to establish a Jewish state in it, to expel its original inhabitants, to
use Palestine as a base for aggression against the neighboring Arab states, and to fulfill (other
aspects of) their aggressive programs.”89
During the Potsdam Conference, Truman, already predisposed to Zionist positions,
delivered a letter to Churchill expressing “the hope that the British Government may find it
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possible without delay to take steps to lift the restrictions of the 1939 White Paper on Jewish
immigration into Palestine.”90 The letter was turned over to Attlee, who succeeded Churchill
during the meeting. Truman’s efforts represented a victory for the Zionists and a defeat for the
State Department. When Truman was asked what “the American position on Palestine” was at a
press conference in Washington, Truman confirmed both his pledge to the DPs in Europe and his
aversion to sending any armed forces to sustain a new regime in Palestine or to re-establish peace
there.91
In order to safeguard U.S. oil interests in the Middle East and not break faith with Saudi
Arabia, Truman wrote King ‘Abd al-Aziz a letter telling him he felt compelled to assist the “pitiful
remnants” of survivors.92 In return, based on a pledge signed by him as well as by Egypt, Syria,
and Lebanon to defend the Arab position in Palestine and Transjordan, King ‘Abd al-Aziz
threatened to wage a war against the United States if America were to commit forces against the
Arabs and allow massive Jewish immigration into Palestine. State Department officials also stated
that King ‘Abd al-Aziz proclaimed that the United States and Britain had the option of being faced
with either a quiet and peaceful Arab world or a blood-soaked Jewish land. 93 Thus, the U.S. policy
threatened to disrupt the friendly relations between the Saudis and the Americans; it also increased
the likelihood of future sanctions against U.S. oil company concessions. Likewise, King ‘Abd alAziz firmly reminded the president of Roosevelt’s pledge vis-à-vis the Arab world and underlined
that Palestine was a legitimate concern for the Arab countries far more than it was for the United
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States, which was thousands of miles away. Since Palestine was protected by the UN charter, it
automatically bore the right to have its future established by international agreement. 94
Roosevelt’s pledge had been a letter to King ‘Abd al-Aziz on April 5, 1945, assuring him
that America was not going to take any hostile actions nor “make a basic decision for Palestine
without consulting with both Arabs and Jews.” 95 Nevertheless, Offner maintains that, despite
FDR’s reaffirmation of his pledge to the Arab world, he also gave his support for a Jewish
commonwealth to the American Zionists.96 On the other hand, the State Department did everything
in its power to uphold FDR’s pledge to the Arab countries and to restrain Truman from further
committing himself to the pledge to the DPs and the creation of a Jewish National Home in
Palestine. Its entreaties fell on deaf ears.97 Truman was seemingly ready to risk everything.
Thus, it was of high importance that Britain, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and possibly
France reach an agreement on a solution to the Palestine issue and on the imperative of consulting
both the Jews and the Arabs before implementing any such plan. 98 After all, the State Department
officials considered the Palestine problem solely Britain’s responsibility and thus made them
accountable for finding a solution.99 The State Department advisors were fully aware of the
complications a decision for a Jewish homeland in Palestine could trigger. Considering the
circumstances, coming up with the best solution possible was in everybody’s interest. Notably,
with the immigration certificates almost exhausted under the 1939 White Paper policy, Britain was
obliged to take a decision on whether to continue with the White Paper policy or to come up with
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a new interim policy given that the Palestinian Arabs were not willing to acquiesce and support
Jewish immigration.100
Against this background, the Zionist leaders decided to take matters into their own hands
since the difficulties faced by the JA in obtaining an immediate relaxing of immigration policy
extended to the area of arms purchases and military training. On October 1, 1945, Ben-Gurion
formed a united Jewish Resistance Movement against the British authorities, creating links with
the Irgun101 and the Lehi102 which were meant to destabilize Britain’s efforts to maintain their
Mandate obligations.103 At the same time, the Haganah104 continued with its illegal immigration
campaign. Morris maintains that “between August 1945 and May 1948, some 70,700 illegals
landed on Palestine’s shores.”
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The Zionist leaders focused on rescuing Jews from Nazi-

occupied Europe by organizing illegal immigration, called Aliyah Bet, arriving by land and by sea
from Europe and the Middle East.106
With regard to the above-mentioned Jewish lobbying on behalf of the Jewish DPs, in June
of 1945 Truman appointed Earl G. Harrison to investigate conditions in the DP camps in Europe,
which were kept in the American zone of occupation in Germany. The Harrison Report detailed
that the refugees were in circumstances similar to those of the German concentration camps. It
stated; “we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not
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exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our military guard
instead of [that of] S.S. troops.”107 The report also endorsed the immediate admission of 100,000
DP Jews to Palestine.108 After the report, when Navy Secretary James Forrestal emphasized that
Saudi Arabian oil relations with the U.S. should not be put at risk, Truman became angry. The
President retorted that he could not act based on the oil supply but would, instead, base his actions
on “what is right.”109 Truman’s endorsement of the Harrison Report certainly won him praise from
longtime Zionist activists as well as Jewish and non-Jewish Americans who viewed the
establishment of the Jewish state as the embodiment of universal ideals and the fulfillment of
biblical prophecy. Moreover, Gendzier maintains that “Truman’s support effectively linked the
predicament of survivors of the Holocaust to Palestine, thus underscoring a connection that
achieved iconic status in the identification of the Holocaust with the formation of the state of
Israel.110
Subsequently, Truman sent a copy of the Harrison report under the cover of a personal
letter to Attlee urging, “no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors
of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into
Palestine.”111 He was persuaded that supporting the Zionist cause, which he claimed the American
people supported, meant that Palestine “should not be closed and that a reasonable number of
Europe’s persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.”112
Attlee replied to Truman “to put Jews at the head of the queue for immigration would stir violence
among other DP camp survivors, violate FDR-Churchill pledges to consult the Arabs on Palestine,
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and jeopardize Britain in India, where ninety million Muslims would be easily inflamed.”113 Due to
the current circumstances, Britain determined that it would be impossible to let any large number of
DPs go to Palestine.”114
As for Truman, he had not just bypassed the State Department; he had also infuriated the
Zionist leaders by not consulting them about his correspondence with Attlee. Because of Weizmann’s
trusted sources in the British government, the Zionists quickly found out about this, and Silver and
Wise immediately issued a statement calling on Truman to prevent “this shameful injustice.”115 Silver
and the AZEC arranged demonstrations, published newspapers ads, and sent some 200,000 telegrams
to the White House to pressure Truman.116 The AZEC demonstrations were predominantly centered
on New York City due to its large number of Jewish residents and its mayoral election in November.
One major demonstration was planned for Madison Square Garden on September 30, 1945,
threatening that “the city’s Jewish voters might punish the administration for its stance on Palestine
by opposing the Democratic mayoral candidate.”117 Even though Truman realized the political stakes
and hoped that Britain would agree to let 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine, the AZEC cautioned
him that “he would lose Jewish votes if he did not side openly with the Zionists.”118
As for British Foreign Secretary Bevin, among other British leaders he presumed that for
political, economic, and strategic reasons Britain needed to maintain its long-term position in the
Middle East, regardless of the anticipated cost, to guarantee its essential recovery from World War II.
Given that the admission of 100,000 DPs would jeopardize Britain’s standing in the region, contradict
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its pledge to consult with the Arab nations, and provoke a serious crisis in Palestine, the report was
rejected. “To admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine would incite grave anti-Semitic policy in England,
cause the Arab world to explode, and rouse dangerous Pan-Islamism.”119 Needless to say, in
Washington and London the focus was now on how to confront the Harrison Report’s findings and
recommendations, which led to yet another committee of inquiry.
Similarly, Moreland, the American Chargé d’Affaires in Iraq, proclaimed that Truman’s
actions were causing press attacks on his suspected support for the admission of 100,000 DPs to
Palestine, concluding that the United States had to choose whether to sacrifice its friendship and
economic interests in the Middle East or defend improper Zionist activities. Iraq both denounced
Truman’s “frank hostility” and also blamed Britain for not interceding.120 Amir Abdullah of
Transjordan also wrote to the President expressing his concerns about Truman’s aims, citing the great
anguish among his people and requesting reconfirmation of any such measure.121 Truman did reply,
assuring him that “no decision should be taken respecting the basic situation in that country without
full consultation with the Arabs and Jews.”122 Many more inquiries about Truman’s allegiances were
received by Henderson from various other Arab countries including Egypt and Saudi Arabia
expressing their views and qualms, asking for reassurance on FDR’s pledge while threatening the
United States with the loss of prestige in the Middle East and the breaking of ties if the humanitarian
project were to be realized.123 The Egyptian Prime Minster was most troubled, by what he saw as
Truman’s total “indifference to and ignorance of the Arab side of the problem.”124 Likewise, Syria
accused the Zionist movement of being a political force working openly for the creation of a Jewish

119

Offner, Another such Victory, 278.
FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, 749.
121
Ibid., 750.
122
Ibid., 707.
123
Ibid., 751-752.
124
Ibid., 794.
120

27

state and the elimination of the Palestinian Arabs, thus threatening not only Palestine but all the Arab
countries, making the issue a life-and-death matter. Syria was deeply worried about the future of the
Palestinians and could not stand idly by and watch the U.S. implement a policy based on a
humanitarian deed that risked setting the entire Middle East aflame.125
To prolong the controversy over the DPs, hoping it would eventually die out as Jewish
refugees settled elsewhere, Britain proposed setting up an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
(AAC) “aiming at securing a balanced committee, one that would represent both State Department
and Zionist views.”126 The Committee was (1) to examine political, economic, and social conditions
in Palestine, (2) to investigate the position of the Jewish DPs in Europe and the absorptive capacity
of Palestine, and (3) to listen to witnesses and consult representative Arabs and Jews to make
recommendations for a permanent solution to the Palestine issue. Truman’s strategic objectives
were totally different from Bevin’s. When he agreed to the committee,127 Truman’s strategy was
to put off “a permanent solution to the political problem” by satisfying the demands of the
“humanitarian Zionists” for the emigration of Jewish DPs to Palestine. He viewed the AAC as a way
“to work something out with Attlee” about the refugees not as a resolution of the matter of a Jewish
or Arab state. Truman agreed that making Palestine a haven for Jews by settling the issue of
immigration was proper policy, but he did not favour making Palestine a Jewish state, calling that a
“theocracy.”128 This was certainly the clearest effort to resolve the conundrum of his backing of the
DPs with his disavowal of a Jewish state.
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Conversely, in creating the AAC, Bevin hoped to reorient the Truman administration more
positively toward British policy in Palestine. He was still unwilling to give in on the matter of
granting 100,000 entry permits to the DPs even if doing so endangered the basis of British foreign
policy and the AAC pact with the U.S. government itself “at a time when American goodwill was
vital to a broad front of political, military, and economic issues.” Britain did not want to infuriate
the Arab world and generate further uprisings in Palestine, as its strategic location was of vital
importance for Britain. Likewise, Bevin anticipated that the committee would discharge Britain
from the Mandate, exchanging it for an international trusteeship. Meanwhile, Britain continued to
enforce the provisions of the 1939 White Paper. The British emphasized that repudiating it would
undermine their position, upon which the imperial interest depended, lead to widespread
disturbances throughout the Middle East, engage military forces, and raise anxiety in India.
Nevertheless, Jews entered Palestine illegally while Zionist leaders used the Jewish pledge to
further the movement’s objective.129
Given the circumstances, Britain, the sole bearer of responsibility for law and order in
Palestine, suggested resettling Jewish refugees first in their home countries and then in nations
outside of Europe.130 Bevin asserted that Jews were neither a nation nor a race, thus he denied their
right to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine claiming that they should “go back to their
countries of origin.”131 He certainly embraced the idea of settling Jewish DPs in places other than
Palestine since he envisaged Palestine as “an Arab monarchy.”132 Louis claims that Bevin failed to
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understand the Palestine problem at large, believing the commissioners would swiftly conclude
that the Palestine territory was too little to absorb all the Jewish DPs in Europe. 133
Once the Zionist leaders in the U.S. and Britain learned of the AAC, they denounced it.
Silver called for boycotting the committee, but Moshe Shertok, the political director of the JA,
declared that “such an action would isolate the Zionists and nothing would be lost by
participation.”134 Aside from accusing Britain of stalling on the Palestine problem further, Rabbis
Wise and Silver also complained to the President saying “it was with the deepest regret that we
learned of the acceptance of our government of the British proposal…What is needed above all
are immediate concrete measures.”135 On November 12, 1945, a thousand Orthodox rabbis
gathered in Washington and sent a delegation to see Truman, requesting support for a Jewish
National Home within the “Biblical boundaries” of Palestine. 136 Zionist leaders viewed Bevin as
cold-hearted when it came to Jewish anguish by promoting the 1939 White Paper as a guiding
principle to solve the postwar Palestine problem and ignoring the fundamental link between the
Jews and the Holy Land.137
The Palestinian Arabs and other Arab countries were outraged by the resolution. King ‘Abd
al-Aziz received numerous telegrams from various Arab leaders, complaining vehemently about
it, accusing America of becoming “tool of aggressive Zionist intervention in Palestine,” and
requesting that the AAC be revoked and confined to Britain and the Arabs only. They maintained
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that America’s approach was a “hostile action” toward the entire Arab world, and the Arabs viewed
U.S. policy as an “irreparable blow to American prestige in Iraq.” 138
At its outset, the committee was to be composed of six U.S. nationals with Truman directly
linked to the selection of participants, among whom were Bartley Crum and James McDonald.
The former was to be a crucial connection with Niles “in securing Truman’s goal of a
recommended solution to the Jewish DP problem.”139 The British government also appointed six
British nationals, all operating under a rotating chairmanship. The AAC had 120 days from its
inception to submit a final report, a plan which was formally announced on November 13, 1945.140
As the AAC pursued its task in early 1946, the tension in Palestine between the Jews and the
British and between the Jews and the Arabs increased, and violence spread dramatically. The first
major event of 1946 came when the Irgun derailed a British payroll train with a bomb. They also
launched coordinated attacks in Jerusalem, and in late January and early February they directed
two successful arms raids against the Royal Air Force facilities. 141 The committee concluded that
“Jews and Arabs in Palestine alike must surrender their arms.” 142 They continued that “the
Committee have drawn attention to the failure of the Jewish Agency to cooperate in dealing with
this evil and have expressed the view that the Agency should at once resume active and responsible
cooperate with the mandatory power.” 143
The AAC inquired into the DPs in Europe, visited the Middle East, and listened to Arab
and Jewish representatives, producing both a report and a set of hearings, allowing a unique

138

FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, 843-844.
Cohen, “Truman and Palestine,” 126.
140
FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, 832-833.
141
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_insurgency_in_Mandatory_Palestine.
142
FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, 590.
143
Ibid., 590.
139

31

opportunity for each of the interested parties to make the complexity of Palestine and their views
known to both the American and British governments.144 The Palestinian Arabs were determined
not to let the Zionist movement shelve their opposition to the movement’s objective, dispossessing
the Palestinians of their land. The JA, on the one hand, presented the committee with graphs to
display Zionist goodwill and information showing “Arab backwardness” while accentuating
“Zionism’s role as a bearer of enlightenment and progress.” 145 The JA worked hard to influence
the committee to choose the Zionist solution, and it succeeded in representing the terrible living
standards of the DPs to the commissioners, who immediately agreed on the desideratum for vast
immigration of DPs Jews to Palestine.146 The report also portrayed the Jews in Palestine as
dissatisfied with and constrained in their endeavors by the continued British presence; the
commissioners ultimately claimed that the Jewish population had no problems in cooperating with
the Palestinian Arabs.147
In contrast, the committee realized the deep-seated roots of Palestinian opposition to
Zionism and British policy maintaining that “Palestine is a country which the Arabs have occupied
for more than a thousand years, and which is therefore the basis of their opposition to Jewish
historical claims.”148 The committee further noted that, unlike their similarly situated Arab
neighbors, they had not been granted independence and that they objected to the failed promises
made by the British in the 1939 White Paper. The Palestinians also strongly contested Truman’s
presidency and rejected the role assigned to the United States in solving the DP problem. The
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committee held, however, that the economic development in Palestine led by the Zionist leaders
furthered both the Jewish and the Palestinian communities as well as the Arabs in the whole
region.149
The AAC report was eventually released in late April 1946. Its recommendations were
unanimous, representing a compromise between the ideas of both the American and the British
commissioners. The report called for (1) admitting immediately 100,000 Jewish DPs from Europe
to Palestine, (2) supporting a Jewish National Home, (3) ending the 1939 White Paper policies, (4)
transforming a UN trusteeship into a unitary state, (5) promoting Arab political-economic
development, (6) disbanding all illegal armies, (7) urging that the national aspirations of both
communities be recognized and that neither one should dominate the other, and (8) protecting the
interests of the three major religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The committee concluded
that “Palestine alone cannot provide for the emigration needs of all Jewish victims of Nazi and
Fascist persecution. The two Governments should, therefore, proceed at once with measures
designed to opposition to the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine will be much stronger if this
movement begins before any indication has been given that steps are being taken to promote the
re-settlement of Jews and other displaced persons in Europe and to secure that other countries
receive a share of those for whose emigration provision must be made.” 150 As a matter of fact, the
Arab states were also “fully prepared to accept their share [of the] burden helping solve [the]
humanitarian question [of] displaced Jews but they [could] see no reason why Palestine, an Arab
country, should be called on to bear it in its entirety.” 151
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Truman embraced the call for the immediate immigration of the 100,000 European Jews
into Palestine confirming immediate assistance by the U.S. government, which was ready to
undertake technical and financial responsibility for the transfer of the immigrants from Europe to
Palestine.152 Henderson and the Zionist leaders regarded the report as an outstanding compromise,
although the Zionists were anxious about the lack of a recommendation for a Jewish state. Most
importantly, Britain, once again, rebuffed the idea of immigration of the DPs to Palestine unless
the Jewish underground army in Palestine were disarmed and the United States would guarantee
military and financial assistance. 153 Britain was very concerned about this intervention, fearing
that it would not only upset their negotiations with Egypt over maintaining a military base there
but also foment an overall uproar in the Middle East.154 In the end, Britain pulled back from the
plan which was seemingly the one that came closest to offering a Palestine solution.
The Arabs rejected the report unequivocally. Although Syria was disappointed but not
unsurprised by Britain’s attitude towards the Arab world, they were infuriated by America’s proZionist stance, jeopardizing Arab-American economic relations.155 The Arab Higher Committee156
(AHC), the central political organ of the Arab Palestinians in Mandatory Palestine, demanded that
the Mandate be abolished, that an Arab democratic government be established, and that foreign
troops be removed. King ‘Abd al-Aziz proclaimed that cooperation with America would be
suspended so long as the atmosphere was clouded by “grave distrust of the basic USA policy in
the Middle East.”157 Overall, the AAC did nothing to bridge the gap in the Anglo-American rift.
Attlee ruled out mass immigration to Palestine until further notice, and Britain continued to enforce
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the 1939 White Paper policies.158 Despite everything, the AAC findings confirmed U.S. backing
for the integration of the Jewish DPs into Palestine, formally recognizing the sensitive plight of
the European Jews.
The Anglo-American negotiations over the AAC report did, however, bring forth the socalled Morrison-Grady Plan. Again, the plan involved Anglo-American efforts to divide Palestine
“into a Jewish province, an Arab province, and the districts of Jerusalem and Negev, the
implementation of which could either lead to a unitary or bi-national state or to partition.” 159 It
also approved immediate transfer of 100,000 Jewish DPs from Europe and called for U.S. funding
for a project to develop Palestine.160 Although Truman initially considered accepting the plan, he
eventually declined it because it was politically unsustainable. He also did not attend the London
conference, which Britain arranged, designed to get both Arab and Jewish support for the plan. 161
The Zionists rejected the plan, and the JA refused to attend the meeting based on the failure of the
plan to “give the Jews sufficient assurances regarding immigration and autonomy in economic
matters.”162 The Morrison-Grady Plan was no more than an extension of the call for the 1939
White Paper’s withdrawal.
Meanwhile, the insurgencies in Palestine picked up momentum when on July 22, 1946, the
Zionist paramilitary group Irgun, led by the future Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin,
bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing ninety-one British officials, Arabs, and Jews. 163
It was considered one of the deadliest attacks against the British during the Mandate period. When
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Truman learned about the bombing, he condemned “the wanton slaying of human beings,” stating
that “such acts of terrorism will not advance, but on the contrary might well retard, the efforts that
are being made…to bring about a peaceful solution to this difficult [problem].” 164
After some time, when American Zionists committed to partition as a strategy, they sought
to pressure Truman to take a firm stand in favor of partition and to sway Britain to agree. Abraham
Feinberg, a wealthy New York businessman, Zionist, and Democratic fundraiser advised Truman
to issue a statement. On October 4, 1946, on the eve of the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, reluctant
about making a declaration, Truman reiterated his “deep interest …that steps be taken at the earliest
possible moment to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.” 165 He also hoped that
“arrangements can be entered into which will make it possible for various countries, including the
United States, to admit many of these persons as permanent residents, …seeking the approval of
the Congress for special legislation authorizing the entry into the United States of a fixed number
of these persons, including Jews.”166 Notably, due to large Jewish immigration entry fleeing
persecution in Eastern Europe, the U.S. had created the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921, 167
successfully restricting their immigration and that of other “undesirables” into the United States.
With the Yom Kippur statement, Truman publicly announced for the first time his backing
for the establishment of a “viable Jewish state in Palestine, the most pro-Zionist statement ever
made by a president, establishing American policy in favor of partition of Palestine.” 168 Before
doing this, Truman neither discussed the matter with the Arab states nor conferred with the British
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government, let alone warn the career State Department experts about his plan.169 Truman went
against his advisors’ foreign policy, deciding to pursue those who were largely interested in retaining
Democratic majorities in Congress. Aside from marking a turning point in the political and diplomatic
struggle and reinforcing the emerging consensus among Americans in support of a Jewish statehood,
the Yom Kippur statement came from its principal backer – the President himself. With his speech,
Truman reaped the political rewards for minimal effort while he avoided becoming any more
committed to a Zionist solution.
Against this background, Britain became aware that it could not rely on the U.S. for a solution
on Palestine particularly after the American President tried hard to win over Jewish-American votes
through promises on Palestine. On February 13, 1947, Bevin presented a memorandum to the
Cabinet, asserting that a solution to the Palestine problem was unfeasible without assistance from
the UN.170 Both the Arabs and the Jews were apprehensive about deferring the issue to the GA. 171
On February 18, 1947, Britain referred the Palestine problem to the UN with no recommendation.
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Chapter IV: The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: The 1947 Partition Plan
When on February 18, 1947, Britain decided to transfer the question of the future of
Palestine into the hands of the UN, the announcement only worsened the situation. 172 Britain’s
intention was not to abandon the Mandate but rather to win the UN’s support for an independent binational state173 which would best secure the “national home” promised by the Balfour Declaration.174
Bevin blamed the mess in Palestine on both the U.S. government and American Zionists as well as
on the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration’s vexed and contradictory promises.175 In fact, what
Bevin wanted from the UN was a recommendation list tailored to the needs of Britain’s interests
in the Middle East, accepted by the Arab nations, and supported by the United States government.
Although Britain refrained from helping the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP), it maintained a proper balance with the committee inasmuch as possible. 176 Britain
was also not responsible for imposing a solution on either Arabs or Jews. If there could be no
agreement, the UN was responsible for reaching a decision.177 With regard to UNSCOP, it was no
other than the UN itself which formed the commission to examine the Palestine situation and make
recommendations to the General Assembly (GA) under the auspices of Trygve Lie, the Norwegian
who was the UN’s first Secretary-General. 178
Truman embraced the UN’s participation while standing idly by, watching UNSCOP
hammer out a political solution for the Palestine problem, which, he believed, it had been created
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to do. To King ‘Abd al-Aziz, Truman maintained that America’s support for a Jewish National
Home in Palestine did not involve any aggressive interests in the region and reflected “no thought
of embarking upon a policy which would be prejudicial to the interests of the indigenous
population of Palestine.”179 Even though Acheson and Henderson expressed aversion to partition,
they both agreed that, considering the complexity of the Palestine problem, “the solution which it
would be easiest for the American government to support would be one based on partition.” 180
Even though the Zionist leaders seemed to be quite forthcoming about partitioning Palestine, they
continued to insist that they “could never accept being a permanent minority” in the Holy Land. 181
Shertok also tried to convince Henderson of the economic importance of including the northern
part of the Negev in a future Jewish state.182
Arab delegations opposed UNSCOP’s formation and sought instead immediate
independence for a “united democratic…Palestinian state.” 183 The Arab states also called for the
immediate “termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence,” a
position of which the UN disapproved, emphasizing that it was still in its early stages of evaluating
the options.184 As the problem solver of last resort, the UN’s quest was now how best to prepare
the groundwork for a substantive working plan that would create two distinct Palestinian and
Jewish entities with homogenous populations, designed to promote partition. This was the
overriding objective of their charge.185 The UN faced many challenges at the outset of the process,
particularly the non-cooperation of both the Arabs and Britain. Above all, the UN’s goal was to
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bridge the gap between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs by implementing an agreement that
met the minimum requirements of each side, an essential step in achieving a solution to the
continuous conflict.
The most surprising development was the position of the Soviet Union. Before World War
II the Soviets had been anti-Zionist and pro-Arab.186 Following the war, they opposed partition
and favored a unified, bi-national Arab-Jewish state in Palestine. In May Andrei Gromyko, the
Soviet representative to the UN, announced his support for “an independent, dual, democratic,
homogeneous Arab-Jewish state.” Should such a plan prove impossible to implement due to the
deteriorating situation between the two peoples, the partition of Palestine into two independent
autonomous states, one Jewish and one Arab, ought to be considered. The Soviets hoped that their
strategy would ingratiate them with the Zionist leaders and make the Truman administration reflect
upon its Cold War and Palestine policies.187 Gromyko’s announcement certainly marked a
watershed along the route to Jewish statehood.
Notably, the central issue of this complex matter was the composition of the committee
itself. After the Arabs’ wish to include a delegate from the Arab states was dismissed, the
participant states of the five permanent members of the Security Council were taken into
consideration. The five included the Republic of China, the French Republic, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States. 188 On the one
hand, America and Britain wanted to be excluded from the inquiry, but, on the other hand, they
also did not want the Soviets to take part in it. After all, it was important that its members be from
nations with no stance on the conflict and no direct engagement in the region, as they would bring
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no predispositions into its final conclusion. This approach automatically ruled out the P5 and the
Arab States, which angered the Soviets.189 Nonetheless, the JA opposed the Soviet Union’s
participation on the committee and urged the United States to submit a resolution to the GA calling
upon Britain “to administer the mandate faithfully” by revoking the 1939 White Paper policies. 190
Essentially, the eleven participants were chosen from countries based on conformity with their
political positions and geographical location, and neither the Arabs nor the Zionists had any
voice.191 On May 15, after the GA adopted a resolution to establish UNSCOP, the delegation set
off to examine the current state of affairs in Palestine and elsewhere and to obtain testimony in
order to give recommendations for the future of Palestine. 192
UNSCOP arrived in Palestine at a time when warfare between the Yishuv and Britain was
in full swing. Both the JA and the Arabs prepared differently for their presentation of their
testimony in front of the committee. From the outset, the JA had well-defined ideas of how to
present their requests to UNSCOP. It designed them to convince the committee to “take an active
initiative to advance the solution of partition”193 and determine “the foundation of a Jewish state
with wide borders in the framework of a solution that would divide the country between the Arabs
and the Jews.” Similarly, the Arabs also had a clear objective. Unlike the Zionists, the Arabs chose
the unbending, all-is-mine attitude194 and were steadfast in not embracing any pragmatic
disposition that might provide a way to a settlement. In fact, the Palestinian Arabs were too quick
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to jump to conclusions that UNSCOP’s intentions were pro-Zionist from the start. This both
influenced the minds of the Arab leaders and spread black despair among the Arab people .195
UNSCOP’s approach to the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs was evenly balanced. The
delegates gave fair chances to both communities to express their opinions and present their
cases.196 When UNSCOP arrived in Jerusalem, they invited the Arab League and the AHC to send
representatives to present their case before them. The AHC refused to cooperate with the delegates
and staged a general strike out of protest. Likewise, it declined to cooperate with UNSCOP during
its travels in Palestine. King Abdullah of Jordan, however, favored partition as the only solution.
Publicly, however, he maintained a stance supporting the Arab leaders’ position. 197 When
Abdullah was asked by UNSCOP whether partition might lead to trouble in the Middle East, he
answered: “The Middle East already has much trouble. If the Jews were treated justly in all
countries, there would be no Jewish and therefore no Palestine problem.” 198
Despite the boycott and the general AHC position, isolated dialogues between UNSCOP
and the Palestinian Arabs did take place. The most important of these testimonies was the one by
Hussein al-Khalidi, the Secretary of the AHC, during a social event. Agreeing with the other Arab
countries, he asserted that the Jews had no historical rights in Palestine and that the Arabs should
not have to suffer because of the DPs in Europe. He strongly opposed a bi-national state and
maintained “that an Arab state must include the whole land of Palestine.”. 199 The boycott prevented
the Arabs from driving home their basic argument that the Jewish problem in Europe should not
and could not be resolved in Palestine, clearing the way for the Zionist leaders to conduct their
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efforts without any counter-arguments. Importantly, UNSCOP was not allowed to visit the Arab
workplaces, and when the delegates arrived in Arab villages, they were deserted, and lunches were
canceled for no reason. This only led UNSCOP to express doubts that the Jews and the Palestinian
Arabs could ultimately share a common future together. 200 Based on its observations, UNSCOP
also concluded that the Palestinian Arab community was unsustainable due to ethnic hostility, had
only mediocre achievements in its welfare and health systems, and had made inefficient
agricultural and industrial efforts. UNSCOP’s hopes of receiving input on the Palestinian
perspective were frustrated all along the way, and the committee eventually concluded that “the
situation is dangerous and insolvable.”201 The Arab request to become independent was thus, in
the view of UNSCOP, simply unrealistic.
The leaders of the JA, on the other hand, presented their well-planned case skillfully. They
appointed leaders such as David Horowitz and Abba Eban to escort the committee. To put it
plainly, Silver maintained that their primary aim was to work for a “Jewish state in a suitable area
of Palestine.”202 The first part of the commissioners’ inquiry took place in the countryside, as they
visited villages and towns. The JA and the Yishuv did everything to ensure a warm welcome for
UNSCOP, organizing guided tours while presenting well-developed industries and rich
commercial life.203 Ben-Gurion claimed that without Zionist zeal “great constructive work,
agricultural, industrial, material and cultural” could not have been achieved and that in turn those
efforts “raise[d] the economic and social standards of all the inhabitants of the country.” 204 Partly
as a result of these efforts, the delegates came away with a strong impression of how well the Jews
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had organized and settled themselves in Palestine as well as of how the Zionist leaders had
managed to present their targeted objectives for the future. Also, during a hearing in Jerusalem,
Ben-Gurion proclaimed to the commissioners, “only by establishing Palestine as a Jewish state
can the true objectives be accomplished: immigration and settlement for the Jews, economic
development and social progress for the Arabs…Nothing will further the Jewish Arab alliance
more than the establishment of the Jewish state.” 205
Ben-Gurion also asserted that the Zionist leaders would not be content with partition “that
would give them a state with reduced borders.” Upon stating this, he outlined a map incorporating
the entire Negev, the area around the Dead Sea, and the Galilee to make sure the commissioners
understood their demands.206 Moreover, Chaim Weizmann, who no longer held any official
position in the Zionist leadership, invited the commissioners to his home in Rehovot, encouraging
UNSCOP to accept partition as the fundamental principle for resolving the Palestine issue. In fact,
Weizmann pushed UNSCOP to implement what the British had failed to do. By reaching out
privately to UNSCOP, Weizmann went beyond public testimony to solve the Palestine problem.
It was thanks to him and his unofficial testimony that UNSCOP realized that the Zionist leaders
had fashioned partition and were ready to support it as long as the boundaries of the state offered
enough land to absorb world Jewry and the Jewish DPs in Europe. 207
Just as importantly, as a result of Britain’s determination to prevent clandestine
immigration, the tragedy of the ship Exodus occurred during UNSCOP’s inquiry in Palestine,208
leaving a stark impression on the delegates. Not only did Britain handle the event violently,
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deliberately overlooking the suffering of the refugees, but it also brought wide-ranging
international condemnation on itself, upon which outcome UNSCOP concluded that the British
were no longer capable of handling the situation there. 209 One of the delegates commented, “if this
was the only way that the British Mandate could continue, it would be better not to continue it at
all,”210 and another commissioner reported that the Exodus saga of 1947 was “the best possible
evidence we have” for allowing the Jews into Palestine. 211 The publicity surrounding the Exodus
incident certainly dramatized the plight of the Holocaust survivors confronted with the implacable
British military and played out to the advantage of the Zionist cause.
Before UNSCOP wrote its final report, the delegates also visited the DP camps in
Europe.212 Many of them came to the conclusion that Palestine could be the only safe haven for
Jews and that the establishment of a Jewish state would be needed to guarantee their security, 213
although other countries had been considered for resettlement of the Jewish DPs of Europe. The
choice not to take other suggested places into consideration may have been related to concerns that
existing or future anti-Semitism might threaten Jews in those countries as well. After all, when
UNSCOP arrived in Geneva, it lacked supporting evidence for either the Arab position or the
British one. The British, through their lack of collaboration with the committee and their conduct
toward the immigrants aboard the Exodus in 1947, had undercut any support for reconfirming the
mandate. Thus, UNSCOP’s decision came down to implementing either partition or some form of
the Morrison-Grady Plan.214
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Nevertheless, UNSCOP released both a majority and a minority plan. The majority plan
was backed by seven members, supporting the creation of a Jewish state including the Negev. 215
The plan was to partition Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish one with a Special International
Regime for the city of Jerusalem. These states were to achieve political independence, although
they were to remain economically unified after a two-year transition period under the auspices of
Britain. The majority of UNSCOP members justified this formula because partition offered the
most viable and practical solution in that it contained a definite prospect of finality. Although the
provisions allowed only 150,000 immigrants into the Jewish State, they provided the DP Jews of
Europe and other Jewish immigrants a livable territory of their own within a few years. 216
Presumably, had Resolution 181 actually been implemented and gained equal acceptance from the
Arab/Palestinian and Zionist/Jewish sides, chances are that both peoples might have found a way
of getting along with one another over time. This would have saved the lives of tens of thousands
of Palestinians murdered during the ensuing conflict, also known as the Nakba, and spared millions
of Palestinians from the humiliation, poverty, and agony which they have been experiencing in
refugee camps and the diaspora.217 Nonetheless, it would seem that the Palestinian Arabs had the
potential to develop economically, politically, and culturally in addition to retaining their national
identity within a Jewish state if only they would have had an adequate leadership and support from
Britain during the Mandate.
The minority plan proposed that Palestine become a single federal state composed of Arab
and Jewish cantons with an overarching federal government and Jerusalem as its capital. The plan
also allowed Jewish immigration into the Jewish state during a three-year transitional period. It
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limited the influx to the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state to be determined by an international
commission. Also, the plan made clear that the Jewish DPs were an international responsibility
and that no claim to a right of unlimited immigration of Jews into Palestine, irrespective of time,
could be entertained. Notably, the Australian delegate abstained from backing either plan, 218 and
all delegates of UNSCOP unanimously agreed that Britain had to relinquish its Mandate and leave
Palestine as soon as possible.219
For Britain, the long-range consequences of carrying out the majority plan were
catastrophic for its position in the Middle East. By adopting the UN recommendation, Britain
would lose its position in the area and its “retention of Arab good will,” estranging the nearby Arab
states.220 The JA, on the other hand, strongly supported partition, aiming to gain the Truman
administration’s support for the proposal. The Zionist leadership regarded the plan as a major
triumph for Zionist diplomacy, granting a matchless charter of international legitimacy for the
creation of an independent Jewish state despite its perceived limitations and the full-size Zionist
aspirations for a state encompassing all of Palestine and Jerusalem envisaged in the Balfour
Declaration. Although the Zionist movement formally accepted the UN Partition Plan, it had no
intention of accepting its limits. It was a formal cosmetic position that masked the real intention
of taking over most of Palestine. As Rabbi Silver maintained, the majority report “represents a
great step forward in comparison with former proposals and should be viewed as the expression
of the conscience of mankind…but the territorial boundaries set for the Jewish state are a great
blow and we must fight against this. I still maintain my previous position that we must demand all
of Palestine and wait for such an offer on the part of the UN Assembly as will prove acceptable
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for us.”221 Eventually, Silver did acquiesce to the majority plan, doing what he did best: influencing
the American administration to support what the Zionist leaders in Palestine required, leading
ultimately to the creation of a Jewish state.
In contrast, the Palestinian Arabs considered UNSCOP’s recommendations biased in favor
of the Jews.222 It created a threat to the future of the Arab Palestinians and to Arabs and Muslims
alike, as they considered themselves the native inhabitants of the country. Walid Khalidi maintains
correctly that “the Arabs constitute[d] a majority of the population of the proposed Jewish state,
and own[ed] the bulk of the land.”223 As for the AHC and the Arab League, they voiced bitter
resentment of the plan, threatening to wage war against the nascent Jewish state.224 The AHC
warned that “any attempt to impose a solution contrary to the Arabs’ birthright will lead to trouble,
bloodshed, and probably a third world war.”225 America, however, disregarded the ultimate
question raised by the AHC over the consideration of partition without the consent of the majority,
given that at that time the Jews of Palestine “owned less than six percent of the total land area of
Palestine and constituted no more than one third of the population.” 226 Although Truman approved
partition, he firmly stated that the U.S. would participate in financing its share only under the
auspices of the UN and that no direct American economic assistance was to be expected. Likewise,
the U.S. was not willing to assume Britain’s longtime responsibility for maintaining order in
Palestine.227
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To put pressure on Truman to officially take a “pro-Jewish policy in Palestine,” Silver
pressed the President by sending many letters and telegrams to the White House. By mid-October
Truman announced his support for UNSCOP’s majority report. 228 Nevertheless, Truman was
frightened of adopting the majority plan due to growing warfare in Palestine, which could lead to
Soviet advancement.229 Yet, in order to make the plan work, the State Department recommended
a change in the majority plan that would result in transferring all of the Negev to the prospective
Arab state which would create territorial contiguity among Egypt, Arab Palestine, and
Transjordan.230 The area was to be inhabited by some sixty thousand Arabs and contain no Jewish
settlements.231
Against this background, through Niles, Truman received Weizmann, who tried to
persuade the President of the Negev’s strategic value to the Jewish state’s prospects for
development. After the meeting, Truman gave explicit instructions to the UN that UNSCOP’s
proposal must retain the Negev within the Jewish state. 232 Truman had, indeed, overridden the
State Department’s plan to allocate the area to the Arabs by stating that nothing should be done to
“upset the apple cart.”233 By the end of November, the GA arranged to vote on the majority plan
influenced by Truman and the White House, which worked vigorously to achieve the necessary
two-thirds of the votes.234 Although Truman gave clear instructions to the UN delegation not to
use threats or improper pressure to gain partition votes, much dealing must have gone on without
Truman’s knowledge. Niles was certainly one who pulled strings behind the scene to win votes for
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partition, reiterating to the President the necessity of buying and getting all the votes they could
and that there would be hell to pay if the voting went the wrong way. 235
During the partition debate at the UN, Clifford also applied pressure on delegates from
indecisive nations without Truman’s consent, 236 while Silver played a major role in affecting the
GA partition vote by swaying world opinion toward the support of the creation of a Jewish state. 237
When the prospective vote on the plan fell one vote short of the two-thirds majority, the JA became
terrified. With Thanksgiving two days away, many countries worried about the plan’s outcome
and delayed the vote from November 25 to November 29. 238 Even though the JA and the AZEC
set up four days of feverish lobbying, they believed, however, that they needed Truman’s
assistance, and in the end his intervention was, indeed, decisive. “The United States exerted the
weight of its influence almost at the last hour, and the way the final vote turned out must be
ascribed do this fact.”239 In a letter to Joseph Proskauer that Truman never sent, he wrote “I don’t
think I have ever had as much pressure put on the White House.” 240
On November 26 Gromyko restated to the GA that the Soviet Union supported partition as
the only practical solution to Arab-Jewish conflict,241 resulting in, to the Zionist’s relief, a vote in
their favor.242 Upon the outcome of the GA vote, Silver stated, “we marshaled our forces, Jewish
and non-Jewish opinion, leaders and masses alike, converged on the government and induced the
president to assert the authority of his administration to overcome the negative attitude of the State
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Department.”243 Weizmann commented that this positive attitude and agreement between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union was almost “tantamount to a miracle.” 244 The President’s approval and
support of the majority plan was consistent with his earlier efforts to secure admission of Jewish
DPs to Palestine. In contrast, the State Department pursued its policy, silently hoping that the UN
would finally fail. Not only did the American State Department view Soviet participation in the
administrative, policing, or military operations in Palestine as “tantamount to a Soviet lodgment”
in the Middle East, but they also considered the Soviet Union a menace to U.S. security. 245
On November 29, 1947, the GA voted in favor of Resolution 181, the one calling for
partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, by a vote of 33 in favor, 13 against, and 10
abstaining. In a rare instance of agreement during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union voted in favor of partition while Britain abstained. 246 Essentially, the Jewish state included
the most fertile land and almost all the Jewish urban and rural space in Palestine. Thus, the state
was to cover approximately 56 percent of Palestine’s territory, composed of the coastal plain, the
lands along the Syrian border, and the Negev Desert. The proposed Arab state was to occupy about
44 percent of the territory, covering a zone surrounding the city of Gaza, the mountains of Judea
and Samaria, most of the Galilee region in the north, and the city of Jaffa. Despite strong Arab
opposition to partition, King ‘Abd al-Aziz had no intention of ending oil sales to or Aramco
concessions with America.247 Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia arranged to take strong measures
against U.S. or British interests in the Middle East over Resolution 181. 248 The Mandate for
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Palestine was to terminate and the British withdrawal to be concluded “not later than August 1,
1948.”249
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Chapter V: UN Trusteeship Proposal: The Establishment of the State of Israel
No sooner did the UN partition plan resolution pass on November 29, 1947, than civil war
between Jews and Palestinian Arabs broke out. Immediately after, the so-called Arab Liberation
Army250 (ALA) entered Palestine to help the Palestinian Arabs defeat the Yishuv. It is important
to note that the Zionist forces which were formed out of the Haganah, the Lehi, and the Irgun
terrorist groups were the better trained and organized during the struggle. Meanwhile, Britain
prepared its withdrawal and intervened only on intermittent basis. 251 On December 5 the State
Department announced an arms embargo on Palestine which was intended to minimize the U.S.
role in the execution of the partition plan and to lessen the violence in the region. 252 Clifford, on
the other hand, believed that partition ought to be supported and sought to lift the arms embargo
with the aim of allowing Jewish self-defense in Palestine and thus avoid having to send U.S. troops
there.253
By December 17, 1947, the State Department circulated a report calling into question
America’s support for Resolution 181, claiming that it was “impossible of implementation.” 254
The report recommended that the United States take no further initiative to implement or help
partition. The State Department, which had opposed partition from its outset, now moved to abort
the Truman administration’s commitment to the partition plan and reverse it by lobbying for a UN
trusteeship.255 Given that the UN charter authorized the use of force to maintain peace against
aggression but not to enforce UN recommendations, e.g. partition, on March 19 Senator Warren
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Austin, American delegate to the UN, announced a coup de grace before the Security Council,
calling for “the immediate convening of a special session of the GA to institute a temporary
trusteeship for Palestine.”256 The State Department’s anti-partition stance shocked not only the
Zionist leaders but also UN Secretary General Trygve Lie as well as many other bystanders. 257
Amid the growing doubts about partition, the JA became alarmed, and the AZEC managed
to pass “resolutions favoring a Jewish state in Palestine. Forty governors and more than half of
Congress signed petitions to the President” after AZEC inundated the White House with mail in
support of partition.258 Only ten days later, on March 19, Senator Austin addressed the UN with
his famous “bombshell,” proclaiming U.S. withdrawal from the partition plan 259 and its hope to
establish a “temporary trusteeship…to maintain the peace and afford the Jews and Arabs of
Palestine, who must live together, further opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the future
government of that country.”260 The Department had finally managed to undermine Truman’s
Palestine policy at long last, precipitating with its maneuver both a delay to the settlement of the
conflict and an increasing uncertainty about the future of governance there.
Silver, representing the JA at the UN, was shaken by Austin’s speech, calling it a “shocking
reversal” of the American support for partition. In a ZOA meeting few days later, he expressed his
disappointment by “threatening reprisal against American troops if they were used to police the
trusteeship.”261 Silver was outraged, blaming Austin’s speech on Forrestal and the oil interests in
the region. Emanuel Neumann, vice chairman of the AZEC and close collaborator of Silver’s in
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the efforts to influence the Jewish community and American public opinion in favor of the Zionist
program, proclaimed that it was “not too late for Truman to shake himself loose from this
conspiracy fostered by oil profiteers.” 262 Austin’s speech had left a sour taste at the UN. The Soviet
representative denounced it, while Arab delegates expressed their approval. 263
The political backlash Truman experienced from the State Department’s act left him open
to being perceived as “a liar and a double crosser” by the Zionist leaders, immediately setting the
scene for a dispute within the administration and for one between the administration and American
Zionists.264 The President also worried that Weizmann would consider him a “shitass,” since they
had met on March 18, just one day before Austin’s speech, and he had reconfirmed his continued
commitment to partition. In order to elucidate the Palestine policy, Truman called a meeting
between the White House and the State Department on March 24, followed by a statement the day
after, asserting that trusteeship was not an alternative to partition but an interim action to maintain
order and stop the killing after Britain’s withdrawal on May 15, 1948. 265 With Austin’s speech,
the State Department had not sought to cut Truman’s throat by imposing trusteeship but to undercut
partition and preserve a good relationship with the Arabs.
Britain viewed the trusteeship proposal as an action for partition and concluded that the
only solution was a bloodbath.266 In contrast, the Zionist leaders opposed trusteeship unless it
heralded a state. The Palestinian Arabs and the AHC as well as much of the rest of the Arab world
avowed that they would “not ever accept a Jewish state.” 267 In the end, the State Department’s UN
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adviser announced that the idea of trusteeship had relinquished and that partition was the only
option since “it would face up to the inescapable fact that a Zionist state already is in being in
Palestine.”268
Although recognition was a presidential prerogative power and Truman could have taken
the decision by himself, on May 12 he announced a meeting at the White House to sound out the
State Department’s position on the future recognition of the Jewish state. Clifford, an important
influence on Truman’s’ decision to recognize Israel, reasoned during the meeting that, to avoid a
bloodbath in Palestine in consonance with the U.S. support of Resolution 181 and to pre-empt the
Soviets, the President should accept the reality on the ground. 269 Moreover, he also advised the JA
to make the necessary preparations for independence. 270 When the State of Israel was announced
on May 15 by Ben-Gurion, Clifford encouraged Truman to immediately recognize the Jewish state
before the Soviets acted and to urge the UN to do the same. The underlying reason behind the fast
recognition was “of the greatest possible importance to the President from a domestic point of
view.”271
At 6:11 P.M. Truman announced to the world his de facto recognition of the State of Israel
which had proclaimed its existence eleven minutes earlier. 272 The de facto recognition had great
symbolical value, particularly as it gave immediate credibility and international standing to the
new Jewish state. While the pro-Zionist White House advisors such as Clifford, Lowenthal, and
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Niles had an important part in the creation of the newborn state, Truman played the leading role
in all of this, ultimately being labeled as “the midwife” of the new State of Israel. 273
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Conclusion
Many Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish, believed that finding a home for Jewish
survivors of World War II was a symbol of helping the oppressed. By envisioning the creation of a
Jewish state as proposed by the Balfour Declaration and confirmed by Wilson as a solemn U.S.
commitment, Truman validated a pre-existing indigenous connection in history with the Holy Land
for world Jewry. For the President and his pro-Zionist White House advisers, the Zionist movement
in Palestine had a humanitarian basis. Yet, as we have seen, the separation between humanitarian
principles and crude politics was not always clearly defined. Truman played it both ways. Although
he was sincerely motivated by humanitarianism, he also reaped the political rewards of gaining
diplomatic support for a politically popular cause and, whether or not the two are directly linked,
managed to win America’s 1948 election handily despite the common expectation that his rival,
Thomas Dewey, would emerge victorious. No doubt Truman was driven to support Jewish statehood
by relentless Jewish lobbying. However, he also saw preventing U.S. military involvement in
Palestine as one of his primary goals. The President’s ideal solution was encompassed in either the
AAC or the Morrison-Grady Plan, but Britain pulled back from the former plan, and the Jews resisted
the latter, while the Arabs fought against both proposals.
In contrast, the State Department persisted in overlooking any pledge that had been made for
a Jewish homeland in Palestine and was both apathetic about the Holocaust survivors and hostile to
Zionism and a Jewish state. Through the lens of U.S. foreign policy, the Department saw sustaining
Arab nationalism and Saudi Arabian interests—especially in view of that country’s geographic
location and its vast oil reserves—as crucial. In addition, it was vital to minimize Soviet influence in
the region, even though the Soviets had supported partition. Thus, the State Department did not want
to anger or alienate the Arabs and risk losing access to the region’s oil by supporting Zionism. State
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Department officials not only contested all of Truman’s policies relating to Palestine from the start,
but they also fought partition by proposing a trusteeship in an effort to nullify the GA’s partition vote.
Somehow, the Department seemed to have failed to comprehend that the Yishuv in Palestine had
already implemented partition and would safeguard its newborn state against any Arab offense. In the
end, the State Department, a staunch opponent of partition and diplomatic recognition of Israel,
accepted the inevitable.
Britain, on the other hand, was completely hostile to partition and believed that only an ArabJewish bloodbath could resolve the Palestine problem. The effects of the GA vote for partition on the
Palestinian Arabs/refugees seem to have reflected ignorance of Palestinian concerns on the part of
those who voted for partition. This may well be attributable to the U.S. policymakers of that time.
They completely overlooked or disregarded Palestinian political and cultural life. Their failure to
educate themselves about the Palestinians’ interests beyond finding solutions to the dilemmas they
faced during the Mandate period made it difficult to assess their real state of affairs, leaving them
ultimately to their own fate.
While it has become clear that domestic political factors swayed White House policy toward
a Jewish state, Zionist supporters also aided the Zionist cause substantially. Both Zionist leaders and
American politicians were convinced that the Jewish vote could influence the election outcome.
Given its increasing weight, the Jewish community pushed the U.S. government into addressing the
Palestine issue in accordance with Zionist aims, finally achieving noteworthy political successes, i.e.,
the 1947 Partition Plan and the recognition of the State of Israel by the President. Outside the White
House, between 1945 and 1948 American Zionist organizations contributed greatly to the creation of
a body of opinion favoring the Zionist cause in Palestine and fostering one that disregarded the Arab
opposition. The pro-Zionist lobby truly came into its own during the Truman presidency. It convinced
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a substantial number of citizens and leaders to join their lobbying efforts and win support from
national and local politicians.
In essence, President Truman played a vital role in the formation of the State of Israel. While
the influence of the Zionists’ lobbying of both the White House and broader public opinion were vital
and critical, it may have been Truman’s own concern for his election that bolstered his commitment
to partition and lightning-fast recognition of Israel. If this is so, Truman can be considered one who
helped to create a pattern of foreign policy related not to humanitarianism but rather to the hard-nosed
calculations of politics, which Davidson went so far as to call “squalid political purposes.” 274
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